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Defunding Prosecutors and Reinvesting in Communities:  
The Case for Reducing the Power and Budgets of Prosecutors to Help 





The movement to end mass incarceration has grown significantly over 
the past decade, with new alliances being built and public opinion shifting to 
support reforms. Yet despite hundreds of laws passed to tackle mass 
incarceration, the criminal legal system’s footprint has not been reduced 
substantially and extreme racial disparities persist. Tens of thousands of 
people are out of prison thanks to reforms, but the nation has not achieved 
the transformational change necessary to end mass incarceration.  
This article argues for a new strategy to tackle mass incarceration, one 
that relies on a similar strategy deployed by the current movement to defund 
the police: reduce the budget and power of prosecutors. The aim of this 
strategy is to force the criminal legal system to significantly narrow its scope 
and to reinvest resources in alternatives to incarceration models and in 
proactive measures that prevent entanglements with the criminal legal 
system. 
As the United States adopted a tough-on-crime approach beginning in 
the 1970s, prosecutors, who are elected in all but three states and Washington 
DC, responded accordingly. They utilized newly-created mandatory 
minimum laws and harsh sentencing schemes, including habitual offender 
and truth-in-sentencing laws, to become tougher in their practices. 
Prosecutors have extraordinary discretionary power in bringing 
charges, proposing bail, and deciding on plea deals. They face little 
interference from defense attorneys or even judges. During the law-and-
order era, prosecutors began to face additional pressures to engage in 
extreme sentencing practices. They were now armed with new tools that gave 
them even more power to exercise their discretion in a punitive manner. As 
the police began to arrest more people, prosecutors also began to use their 
 
 1. Udi Ofer is the Deputy National Political Director of the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU), and Director of the ACLU’s Justice Division. Mr. Ofer is a visiting lecturer 
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own discretion to influence incarceration rates by charging individuals more 
aggressively and becoming tougher in their plea-bargaining tactics.  
Prosecutor offices have grown dramatically during the era of mass 
incarceration. Between 1994-2007 alone, prosecutor budgets increased by at 
least $3 billion. In some cities, like New York City, prosecutor staffing has 
tripled over the past 40 years despite crime rates in New York City being at 
historic lows. New York City alone spends nearly half a billion dollars a year 
on its five borough prosecutors and citywide Special Narcotics Prosecutor. 
During the 10 years of Cy Vance, the number of staff in the Manhattan 
District Attorney office grew by 25 percent. And like in the rest of the nation, 
Black and Latinx communities have disproportionately faced the 
consequences of these new resources being poured into prosecution. In 
Manhattan, 56 percent of people arrested in 2018 were Black, 34 percent 
were Latinx, and just 14 percent were white. 
Yet in New York City, as in other cities across the nation, the large 
majority of the prosecutor docket consists of low-level offenses, many of 
which should not involve the criminal legal system in the first place. 
Nationwide, about 70-80 percent of cases are for misdemeanors.  
It’s time to rethink this entire system and to do so by dramatically 
narrowing its scope and power, including by removing criminal legal system 
actors, such as prosecutors, from the equation altogether whenever possible. 
At the heart of this must be a reorientation from the tough-on-crime era to a 
prioritization of social welfare, public health, and alternatives to policing, 
prosecution, and incarceration as the primary mechanisms to build 
community safety.  
The United States has spent decades investing in extreme punishment 
as a way to address behaviors that shouldn’t involve the criminal legal 
system in the first place. Now it must spend the time and resources doing the 
opposite: investing in alternative models of public safety. 
Part I of this article reviews the rise of mass incarceration in the United 
States and the impact of law-and-order politics on driving incarceration rates. 
This began with a shift in presidential politics and both Republican and 
Democratic candidates beginning to call for more incarceration. The 
ideological shift flowed down to policing and prosecution, which became the 
front lines in the new tough-on-crime era that criminalized Black 
communities across the nation. This section explains how both police and 
prosecutors began to use their extraordinary discretion to push for more 
arrests, incarceration, and tougher sentences. Part I ends with a review of 
reform efforts, including to elect progressive prosecutors, and how these 
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efforts have not succeeded in achieving the type of transformational change 
needed to end mass incarceration. 
Part II makes the case for defunding prosecutors, by reducing their 
scope, size and budgets, as part of the solution to ending mass incarceration. 
It explains the need to deemphasize reforms that continue to rely on the 
criminal legal system instead of focusing on reducing the size and scope of 
criminal legal system actors, including prosecutors. It documents how 
prosecutorial budgets have increased dramatically during the rise of mass 
incarceration and how even newly elected progressive prosecutors have 
pushed for more funding and staffing, while the majority of their docket 
continues to focus on many behaviors that shouldn’t involve the criminal 
legal system in the first place, like prosecuting thousands of drug arrests. Part 
II ends by making the case for reducing the prosecutorial footprint as part of 
the strategy to end mass incarceration and emphasizes that the movement 
cannot rely solely on system actors, including progressive prosecutors, to be 
the ones pushing for these transformational reforms. 
Part III lists eight recommendations under five categories of reforms, 
including: (1) policymakers should restrict prosecutorial authority by (a) 
decriminalizing laws that will lead to fewer arrests and prosecutions, (b) 
declining to prosecute broad categories of cases, and (c) regulating 
prosecutorial discretion, through legislation, as a strategy to advance 
decarceration. (2) State, local and federal policymakers and prosecutors 
should cut prosecutor budgets, given that they will have fewer cases to 
prosecute under the changes contained in the first recommendation. (3) Local 
district attorney races should become referenda on a candidate’s willingness 
to divest from prosecutors and to commit to declining to prosecute categories 
of arrests. (4) Savings from defunding prosecutors should be invested in 
Black and other communities historically targeted by police and prosecutors. 
And (5) The system as a whole should reimagine how to tackle offenses 
involving violence, redirecting those cases away from prosecutors and the 
criminal legal system whenever possible. 
The majority of prosecutor office dockets are comprised of 
misdemeanors and low-level offenses that should not involve the criminal 
legal system. Prosecutor budgets have increased by billions of dollars, while 
many social welfare programs have been cut or remained stagnant. We need 
to shrink prosecutorial budgets so that prosecutors no longer spend their time 
on matters that should involve social welfare programs, not the criminal legal 
system. The savings should be reinvested in alternative mechanisms to 
improve community safety as well as in proactive measures that prevent 
people from becoming entangled in the criminal legal system in the first 
place. 
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I. Rise of Mass Incarceration Nation 
 
a. Incarceration rates quintuple in the United States 
 
The United States incarcerates more people, both per capita and by 
volume than any other nation in the world.2 On any given day, there are 2.3 
million people incarcerated in 3,134 local jails, 1,833 state prisons, 218 
immigration detention facilities, and 110 federal prisons.3 In comparison, the 
United Kingdom has one-fifth of the United States’ prison incarceration rate, 
while Canada has one-sixth and Germany one-tenth.4  
Victimization rates cannot explain this American exceptionalism, as the 
United States ranks about the same as countries in Western Europe.5 Rather, 
it is explained by a cultural and political backlash that began in the United 
States during the 1960s in reaction to civil rights protests and growing calls 
for racial justice. Crime did increase in the 1960s, as it did outside of the 
United States, but the United States suffered a unique backlash driven by 
racism and that outlasted any temporary increase in crime rates. This 
backlash led to the implementation of a destructive tough-on-crime approach 
to public safety that continues to have a devastating impact on people of 
color in the United States.6  
During a span of 40 years, states and the federal government began to 
pass laws and institute practices that criminalized more behaviors and 
increased jail and prison sentences dramatically.7 In the 1970s, the rate of 
incarceration in the United States began to increase, eventually quintupling 
over four decades.8 Once out of prison, people began facing approximately 
 
 2. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Yes, U.S. Locks People up at a Higher Rate Than Any Other 
Country, WASH. POST (July 7, 2015). 
 3. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON 
POLICY INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html.   
 4. Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2018, 
PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (June 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html. 
 5. International Crime Victims Survey, UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND 
JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (1989-2010), http://www.unicri.it/services/library_documentat 
ion/publications/icvs/; Zack Beauchamp, America Doesn’t Have More Crime Than Other 
Rich Countries. It Just Has More Guns, VOX (Feb. 15, 2018) (the United States does have a 
higher homicide rate, but that is explained by greater availability of guns, which leads to more 
use of deadly force). 
 6. JEREMY TRAVIS, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 106 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 1st ed. 2014).   
 7. Id. at 130. 
 8. Id. 
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45,000 legal restrictions that make it nearly impossible to reintegrate back 
into society,9 creating a legalized form of discrimination that deprives 
millions of people of their right to vote and other basic human rights. The 
impact has been dramatic, changing the character of the nation.10  
While mass incarceration grew both in size and budget, many social 
services programs faced cuts or remained stagnant, resulting in prisons and 
jails becoming the primary institution to house people with medical, mental 
health, and substance abuse needs. For example, while deinstitutionalization 
freed hundreds of thousands of people with mental illness from brutal 
facilities, community mental health services have not filled the need for care 
as the federal government failed to provide funding for mental health 
community services and states cut their budgets for mental health hospitals 
without replacing those services.11   
The incarcerated population today suffers from extreme racial and 
ethnic disparities due to racist policies and practices. A Black boy born today 
has a 1-in-3 chance of being incarcerated, compared to a 1-in-17 chance for 
a white boy.12 Black and Latinx people represent about 30 percent of the 
 
 9. A.B.A., Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Judicial Bench Book, 
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (Mar. 2018). 
 10. The two decades that saw the biggest spike in incarceration each had their own policy 
themes. In the 1980s, the US Congress and most state legislatures enacted laws mandating a 
minimum length prison sentence for drug offenses and offenses involving violence. President 
Ronald Reagan also formalized the war on drugs, first announced by Richard Nixon. The 
Reagan administration focused on crack cocaine, particularly in Black neighborhoods, as a 
way to build support for his war on drugs. Id. at 120. In this decade legislatures passed laws 
mandating mandatory minimums of 5, 10, and 20 years. Id. at 86. The 1980s saw the largest 
increase in state incarceration rates, with state incarceration rates growing 107 percent. Id. at 
54. The 1990s were all about increasing length of sentences and making sure people don’t get 
out once in prison. In the 1990s, Congress and more than half of the states passed “three 
strikes you’re out” laws that mandated minimum sentences of 25 years or longer for repeat 
offenders. Id. at 73. A majority also adopted “truth-in-sentencing” laws requiring people to 
serve at least 85% of their prison sentence. Id. During this period state incarceration rates 
grew by 55 percent, although from a much larger base compared with 1980. In this decade, 
time served replaced imprisonment per arrest as the leading factor in growth in incarceration 
rates. For example: In 1986, people released after serving time for a federal drug offense had 
spent an average of 22 months in prison. By 2004, people convicted on federal drug offenses 
were expected to serve almost three times that length: 62 months in prison. At the state level, 
the number of people in prison for drug offenses increased ten-fold since 1980. Id. at 56. 
 11. The existing mental health system today fails to provide adequate treatment.  Ill-
Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 21, 
2003), https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/10/21/ill-equipped/us-prisons-and-offenders-men 
tal-illness#. 
 12. Trends in U.S. Corrections, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www. 
sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf. 
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United States population, yet 60 percent of the nation’s people in prison.13 A 
majority of people in prison have drug, alcohol, or mental health needs,14 
and 40 percent suffer from at least one chronic health condition.15 Due to 
extreme sentences, nearly 200,000 people age 55 and older are incarcerated 
in the United States.16 And while mass incarceration impacts many more 
men by sheer volume and rate, incarceration rates have increased more 
rapidly for women than for men since the early 1970s, particularly 
incarceration rates of Black women.17 
 
b. Law-and-order politics drive mass incarceration 
 
Incarceration rates increased in the United States as a result of political 
decisions made by policymakers on the federal and local levels.18 
Presidential politics have driven this shift, shaping the national narrative and 
influencing both political parties. These policies seep down to state and local 
politics. It was during this period that both police and prosecutorial practices 
began to transform, becoming the front lines in the new tough-on-crime era 
that criminalized Black communities across the nation in the name of a failed 
War on Drugs.19 
 
i.  Presidential politics push a law-and-order narrative 
 
Law-and-order politics, and in particular their exploitation by 
presidential campaigns, have played a key role in the rise of mass 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, NCJ 213600, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: 
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. 
 15. Amy J. Harzke & Sandi L. Pruitt, Chronic Medical Conditions in Criminal Justice 
Involved Populations, 41 J. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES ADMIN. 306, 310 (2018). 
 16. Matt McKillop & Frances McGaffey, Number of Older Prisoners Grows Rapidly, 
Threatening to Drive Up Health Costs, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Oct. 7, 2015), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/10/07/number-of-
older-prisoners-grows-rapidly-threatening-to-drive-up-prison-health-costs. One of the results 
of mass incarceration policies has been that sentence lengths have increased dramatically. We 
are still feeling this impact on the level of incarceration. An analysis done by The Sentencing 
Project found that the number of people serving life sentences continues to grow even while 
serious violent crime has been declining for the past 20 years.  Id.  The lifer population has 
nearly quintupled since 1984.  Id.   
 17. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 12. 
 18. TRAVIS, supra note 6, at 104. 
 19. Id. at 50. 
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incarceration.20 The 1964 presidential election between United States 
Senator Barry Goldwater and incumbent president Lyndon Johnson marked 
a turning point for law-and-order politics in the United States, as recounted 
by Michelle Alexander in her seminal book, The New Jim Crow: Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.21 Goldwater ran an unabashed 
law-and-order campaign, deploying race-based appeals to a white electorate 
opposed to racial justice and slamming the civil rights movement as being 
violent and un-American.22  
Goldwater lost the 1964 election, but his candidacy provided a boost 
for both the conservative movement and the tough-on-crime narrative that is 
still felt today.23 Crime rates increased in the 1960s in the United States and 
internationally, yet law-and-order became a persistent narrative in national 
and local politics even after crime rates began to dip.24 Politicians pledged 
their support for punitive policies without evidentiary support for these 
policies’ long-term effectiveness in addressing crime rates, let alone 
consideration for whether certain behaviors should be criminalized in the 
first place.25 Even though Lyndon Johnson was the less punitive-minded 
candidate in the 1964 election, he launched his own war on crime in 1966.26 
It was Johnson, the creator of the “War on Poverty,” who first used the term 
“War on Crime” and created the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration, a federal agency that funded state and local law 
enforcement, dramatically expanding the federal government’s role in local 
police.27  
During the 1968 election, candidate Richard Nixon showed that a law-
and-order candidate could win and expand the base of the Republican Party 
by appealing to southern white Democrats who opposed the civil rights 
movement.28 As president, Nixon lived up to his tough-on-crime mantra. In 
 
 20. See, e.g., Id. at 106. 
 21. Id. at 108.   
 22. Goldwater 1964 Campaign Commercials, C-SPAN (Nov. 1, 1964), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?31232-1/goldwater-1964-campaign-commercials. 
 23. Arthur Rizer & Lars Trautman, The Conservative Case for Criminal Justice Reform, 
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2018). 
 24. Michael Tonry, Why Crime Rates Are Falling Throughout the Western World, 43 
CRIME & JUST. 1 (2014). 
 25. The calls for tough-on-crime policies have little connection to actual crime rates, as 
these calls have persisted when crime is down and when crime is up.  
 26. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE 
MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (Harv. Univ. Press 2016). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Nixon made law-and-order a central theme of his campaign, dedicating 17 speeches 
solely to the topic. His paid media campaign also focused on the issue, with one of his TV ads 
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1971, he launched a new War on Drugs, proclaiming, “public enemy number 
one in the United States is drug abuse…it is necessary to wage a new, all-
out offensive.”29 The declaration of the War on Drugs was more political in 
nature than a genuine response to a public health problem. 
Law-and-order politics gained even more steam under President Ronald 
Reagan. He not only ran on the platform but also launched his own more 
aggressive War on Drugs that pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into 
law enforcement.30 His media offensive was just as damaging, perpetuating 
racist images of a crack-cocaine epidemic plaguing American cities and 
Black communities, showing none of the empathy seen today in response to 
the opioid epidemic in rural white communities.31 Within a few years of 
launching a new War on Drugs in 1982, both funding for drug law 
enforcement and the political focus on the drug war had increased 
substantially.32 As a result, there was a surge of arrests for drug offenses 
beginning in the 1980s, particularly in low-income communities of color, 
which continues today.33 
Reagan’s successor, President George H.W. Bush, boosted the racist 
message even further when he ran the infamous Wille Horton campaign ad 
featuring a Black man convicted of murder who, while on work furlough, 
raped a white woman.34 But by the late 1980s, many more Democratic 
politicians adopted the tough-on-crime rhetoric, seeking to wrest control of 
 
explicitly calling on voters to reject the “lawlessness” of the civil rights movement. MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 59 
(The New Press 2012). Nixon tapped into white voter fear over the riots (or what many would 
call rebellions) taking place across the country, including following the murder of Martin 
Luther King Jr. in 1968.  
 29. Chris Barber, Public Enemy Number One: A Pragmatic Approach to America’s Drug 
Problem, RICHARD NIXON FOUND. (June 29, 2016), https://www.nixonfoundation.org/ 
2016/06/26404/. 
 30. Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, Address to the Nation on the Campaign Against Drug 
Abuse (Sept. 14, 1986), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-cam 
paign-against-drug-abuse. 
 31. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 55 (The New Press 2012). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Brian Baker, Bush Made Willie Horton an Issue in 1988, and the Racial Scars Are 
Still Fresh, N.Y. TIMES (Dec, 3, 2018). The ad blamed Bush’s opponent, Massachusetts 
governor Michael Dukakis, for the rape. Id. This racist ad played on TVs across the nation for 
months during the 1988 presidential election. Id. 
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crime issues from Republicans.35 In fact, the two parties began a bidding war 
calling for increased penalties for drug use and other offenses.36 Senator 
Joseph R. Biden was one of the biggest proponents of this strategy.37 
According to The New York Times, in 1989, Senator Biden criticized 
President George H. W. Bush for “not doing enough to put ‘violent thugs’ in 
prison.”38 According to the Times: 
In a 1994 Senate floor speech, [Biden] likened himself to another 
Republican president: “Every time Richard Nixon, when he was 
running in 1972, would say, ‘Law and order,’ the Democratic match or 
response was, ‘‘Law and order with justice’ — whatever that meant. 
And I would say, ‘Lock the S.O.B.s up.’”39 
But it was Bill Clinton who as a Democrat most seized on this strategy 
while running for president in 1992.40 Clinton, the then Governor of 
Arkansas, left the presidential campaign trail right before the first primary to 
oversee the execution of Ricky Ray Rector, a mentally impaired Black man 
who had such little conception of reality that he asked for the dessert from 
his last meal to be saved until the morning.41 Once elected, Clinton 
championed habitual offender and truth-in-sentencing laws and the 1994 
Crime Bill, all of which continue to lead to extreme sentences and exacerbate 
racial disparities in incarceration.42  
By the late 1990s, there were few differences between many Democrats 
and Republicans on matters of crime and law-and-order. According to the 
National Academy of Sciences, by 1994, every state had adopted at least one 
35. Sheryl Gay Stolberg &Astead W. Herndon, ‘Lock the S.O.B.s Up’: Joe Biden and the
Era of Mass Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2019); German Lopez, The controversial 
1994 crime law that Joe Biden helped write, explained, VOX (Sep. 29, 2020). 
36. Udi Ofer, How the 1994 Crime Bill Fed the Mass Incarceration Crisis, ACLU (June
4, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/mass-incarceration/how-1994-crime-bill-
fed-mass-incarceration-crisis; TRAVIS, supra note 6 at 122. 
37. Stolberg & Herndon, supra note 35.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. ALEXANDER, supra note 31. See also Gwen Ifill, THE 1992 CAMPAIGN: The
Democrats; Clinton, in Houston Speech, Assails Bush on Crime Issue, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 
1992). 
41. Ron Fournier & National Journal, The Time Bill Clinton and I Killed a Man, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY (May 28, 2015). Following the execution, Clinton said “no one can say 
I’m soft on crime.” Michael Kramer, Frying Them Isn’t the Answer, TIME MAGAZINE: THE
POLITICAL INTEREST (Mar. 14, 1994). 
42. Ofer, supra note 36.
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mandatory minimum law.43 What constituted a liberal versus a conservative 
politician became unclear, at least when it came to questions of criminal 
justice.  
 
ii. Police Respond with a Broken Windows and tough-on-
crime approach  
 
As the law-and-order narrative swept the United States, mayors and 
police departments responded to these changes in political incentives 
accordingly and began implementing their own versions of tough-on-crime 
strategies.  
In the 1980s, as Presidents Reagan and Bush pushed the tough-on-crime 
narrative, a new theory of policing began to take hold: Broken Windows. 
First introduced in a 1982 Atlantic Monthly article, proponents of this theory 
argued that the appearance of disorder breaks down community controls and 
leads to community members feeling less committed to their neighborhoods, 
thus allowing for the introduction of criminal elements into a community.44 
 
 43. TRAVIS, supra note 6, at 83. 
 44. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Mar. 1982). According to the article, “social 
psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is 
left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken…[O]ne unrepaired broken 
window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing.” Id. “We 
suggest that “untended” behavior also leads to the breakdown of community controls. A stable 
neighborhood of families who care for their homes, mind each other’s children, and 
confidently frown on unwanted intruders can change, in a few years or even a few months, to 
an inhospitable and frightening jungle…Such an area is vulnerable to criminal invasion. 
Though it is not inevitable, it is more likely that here, rather than in places where people are 
confident they can regulate public behavior by informal controls, drugs will change hands, 
prostitutes will solicit, and cars will be stripped.” Id. Thus, they concluded, “serious street 
crime flourishes in areas in which disorderly behavior goes unchecked,” and this disorder 
must be checked and stopped. Id. Broken windows policing has been widely criticized.  See 
Bernard Harcourt, Policing Disorder: Can We Reduce Serious Crime by Punishing Petty 
Offenses?, BOS. REV.: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, Apr./May 2002 (criticizing the lack of an 
adequate definition of disorder, and suggesting that what proponents of broken windows 
policing might call disorder may be perceived entirely differently by another segment of the 
population, and may actually mean strong community bonds –graffiti is one example. The 
article also provides alternative theories for the decline in crime in New York City by 
providing examples of declining crime rates in other cities that did not implement broken 
windows policing); Benjamin Bowling, The Rise and Fall of New York Murder: Zero 
Tolerance or Crack’s Decline?, 39 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 531 (1999) (attributing the decrease in 
homicide rates in the 1990s to the decrease of the crack cocaine epidemic, which had begun 
before the implementation of broken windows policing); and Bernard Harcourt, Reflecting on 
the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows 
Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998) 
(disputing the claim that reducing public disorder deters serious crimes). 
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Police can stop serious crimes from occurring by aggressively cracking 
down on minor crimes and any appearance of public disorder—such as 
graffiti, drugs, loitering, trespassing, intoxication, disorderly conduct, and 
fare-beating.45 
The authors of this theory, George Kelling and James Wilson, conceded 
that police officers responding aggressively to the appearance of public 
disorder and minor offenses (even those that are not criminal) raises Fourth 
Amendment and racial profiling concerns.46 They recognized that these 
policies and practices might disproportionately target black and Latinx 
residents.47 But ultimately, they largely ignored these concerns.48  
These aggressive strategies—relying primarily on arrests but also on 
stop-and-frisk and other surveillance tactics—have had devastating impacts 
on people of color. Nationwide arrests began to soar during this period. In 
1980, police conducted 10,458,260 arrests.49 By 1997, arrests had peaked at 
15,290,920, an increase of 46 percent.50 A 2008 study found that one out of 
three young adults—and nearly half of all black men—had an arrest record 
by age 23.51  
 
New York City under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani was the first to experiment 
with Broken Windows policing (also known as order maintenance policing), 
offering important insight into the changes in policing practices 
nationwide.52 Giuliani made law and order his signature issue as mayor, 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. “The concern about equity is more serious. We might agree that certain behavior 
makes one person more undesirable than another but how do we ensure that age or skin color 
or national origin or harmless mannerisms will not also become the basis for distinguishing 
the undesirable from the desirable? How do we ensure, in short, that the police do not become 
the agents of neighborhood bigotry? . . . We can offer no wholly satisfactory answer to this 
important question. We are not confident that there is a satisfactory answer except to hope 
that by their selection, training, and supervision, the police will be inculcated with a clear 
sense of the outer limit of their discretionary authority. That limit, roughly, is this—the police 
exist to help regulate behavior, not to maintain the racial or ethnic purity of a neighborhood.” 
 49. HOWARD N. SNYDER, NCJ 234319, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: ARREST IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1980-2009 at 14 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aus8009.pdf. 
 50. HOWARD N. SNYDER, NCJ 239423, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: ARREST IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1990-2010 at 16 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aus9010.pdf. 
 51. Erica Goode, Many in U.S. Are Arrested by Age 23, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
19, 2011). 
 52. Shankar Vedantam, How a Theory of Crime and Policy Was Born, and Went Terribly 
Wrong, NPR: HIDDEN BRAIN (Nov. 1, 2016, 12:00AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/11/01/ 
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encouraging NYPD officers to implement Broken Windows policing by 
responding aggressively to so-called quality of life offenses.53 Concentrating 
policing on low-level offenses in neighborhoods with signs of “disorder” 
brought massive numbers of poor Black and Latinx people into the criminal 
legal system. According to research conducted by Issa Kohler-Hausmann, in 
New York City, misdemeanor arrests increased four-fold and summonses 
three-fold compared to pre-Broken Windows levels.54 These increases were 
the greatest for Black and Latinx individuals, measured both by total 
individuals and by arrest-per-individual.55  
Following Giuliani, Mayor Michael Bloomberg continued the Broken 
Windows strategy and increased dramatically another so-called preventive 
measure meant to reduce serious crimes: stop-and-frisk. During 
Bloomberg’s first year in office, the NYPD conducted 97,296 stops.56 By 
2011, the number of stops increased to 685,724.57 The vast majority of 
people stopped-and-frisked were innocent of any crime. Black and Latinx 




 53. Rudolph Guliani Interview, ACADEMY OF ACHIEVEMENT (May 3, 2003), 
http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/giu0int-1. (“Well, I very much subscribe to the 
“Broken Windows” theory, a theory that was developed by Professors Wilson and Kelling, 
25 years ago maybe. The idea of it is that you had to pay attention to small things, otherwise 
they would get out of control and become much worse…Aggressive panhandling, the 
squeegee operators that would come up to your car and wash the window of your car whether 
you wanted it or not—and sometimes smashed people’s cars or tires or windows—the street-
level drug-dealing; the prostitution; the graffiti, all these things that were deteriorating the 
city.”); see also Catherine S. Manegold, Giuliani, On Stump, Hits Hard at Crime and How to 
Fight It, N.Y. TIMES (October 13, 1993); William J. Bratton, The New York City Police 
Department’s Civil Enforcement of Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J. OF L. AND POL’Y 447 (1995). 
William J. Bratton, Mayor Giuliani’s first police commissioner, had previously implemented 
this strategy as head of the New York City Transit police and under Giuliani expanded it to 
the entire city. Id. 
 54. See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL 
CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 43 (2018). 
 55. As documented by Kohler-Hausmann, this was the outgrowth of the extreme 
concentration of misdemeanor arrests in precincts with high levels of poverty and serious 
crime and, given residential segregation, majority-Black-and-Latinx populations. Id. at 55. 
 56. Emma G. Fitzsimmons and Joseph Goldstein, ‘I Was Wrong,’ Bloomberg Says. But 
This Policy Still Haunts Him., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2020). 
 57. Donna Lieberman, Art Eisenberg, Chris Dunn, Udi Ofer, Bloomberg Letter: Stop and 
Frisk, NYCLU (Oct. 4, 2012), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/releases/Bloomberg_ 
letter_StopandFrisk_10.04.12.pdf. While the program was conducted in the name of 
retrieving guns—which as framed was not a constitutional legal basis for a stop since it lacked 
individualized suspicion—only 0.1 percent of stops and 0.2 percent of frisks resulted in the 
recovery of a gun. 
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percent of these stops were of individuals age 14-24.58 In 2011, the number 
of stops of young black men (ages 14 to 24) exceeded the entire city 
population of young black men (168,126 as compared to 158,406).59 
As police began to emphasize street-level drug arrests, it became a 
primary driver in increasing arrest rates in New York City and across the 
nation. Nationwide, between 1980 and 2015, arrests for drug offenses nearly 
tripled, rising from 580,900 arrests in 1980 to 1,558,862 in 2019.60 Of those 
total arrests, the vast majority, 86.7 percent in 2019, were for possession.61  
 
c. Prosecutors act as the frontline in mass incarceration nation 
 
As the politics of mass incarceration infiltrated presidential politics and 
policing practices, they also influenced prosecutorial practices. The rise in 
prosecutorial power is linked to the changing politics of mass incarceration. 
As the United States adopted a tough-on-crime approach, prosecutors,62 who 
are politicians elected in all but three states (AK, CT, and NJ) and 
Washington DC, responded accordingly by utilizing newly created 
mandatory minimum laws and doubling down on a new War on Drugs.  
Prosecutors work closely with police and take over the case following 
an arrest. They have extraordinary discretion to bring charges, propose bail, 
and decide on plea deals with little interference from defense attorneys or 
even judges. Prosecutors can bring charges that are higher than warranted 
and pressure defendants to negotiate in plea discussions and accept unfair 
plea deals rather than face more severe consequences at trial. People who 
can afford a vigorous defense can fight off this pressure, but most people 
cannot. 
The same pressures faced by police to become tougher on crime also 
encouraged and even incentivized prosecutors to become more punitive in 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 3.  
 61. Arrests for Drug Abuse Violations, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/tables/arrest-table.xls (last visited Dec. 7, 2020). Few of 
those entering prison because of drug offenses were kingpins or major traffickers. Id. A 
substantial number were convicted of no greater offense than personal drug use or possession. 
Id. In 2019, nearly 24 percent of people in state prisons for drug offenses were incarcerated 
simply for drug possession. Id.  
 62. In total, there are more than 2,300 prosecutor offices. STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN 
BANKS, NCJ 234211, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS 
(2011), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pb detail&iid=1749. 
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their practices and in the discretion that they exercise.63 As prosecutors 
began to adopt harsher law-and-order viewpoints, sentencing outcomes 
began to reflect these new priorities. A prosecutor’s political views played a 
determinative role in their sentencing practices.64 The number of people 
serving time in prison and the length of sentences under a prosecutor’s 
jurisdiction were heavily influenced by a prosecutor’s political leanings and 
whether they subscribe to the tough-on-crime philosophy.65 
Emily Bazelon gives the example of a prosecutor’s office in Memphis 
handing out the “Hammer Award” for prosecutors who win heavy 
sentences.66 As incentives changed, and prosecutors were rewarded for 
aggressive and punitive practices, prosecutors became a more dominant 
force in the criminal legal system. As the police brought more people into 
the criminal legal system, prosecutors became more empowered politically 
to use their discretion to lock more people up for the longest period 
possible.67  
Being a prosecutor has also been a golden ticket to a successful political 
career. Among public officials who held office between 2007-2017, 38 
percent of state attorneys general, 19 percent of governors, and 10 percent of 
U.S. senators had prosecutorial backgrounds.68 This was true in Republican 
as well as Democratic circles. Being tough-on-crime has been good politics 
for a prosecutor and their ambitions. As this article argues, the political 
incentives have come from up top, as the top office holders in both political 
parties advanced tough-on-crime platforms.  
 
 63. See, e.g., TRAVIS, supra note 6, at 104. 
 64. Ashna Arora, Too Tough on Crime? The Impact of Prosecutor Policies on 
Incarceration, AM. ECON. ASS’N (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2019/ 
preliminary/paper/9bQ48ZTA. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Sean Illing, How Bad Prosecutors Fuel America’s Mass Incarceration Problem, VOX 
(May 15, 2019). 
 67. There is little oversight of prosecutorial discretion, The Model Rules of Professional 
Responsibility require that prosecutors make “reasonable” charging decisions. Criminal 
Justice Standards: Prosecution Function, A.B.A.  The federal Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits prosecutors from acting with racial bias, but at the same time the United States 
Supreme Court has granted prosecutors absolute immunity from claims brought under § 1983 
when acting within the scope of their duties. Bidish Sarma, Private: After 40 Years, Is It Time 
to Reconsider Absolute Immunity for Prosecutors?, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY (July 
19, 2016), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/after-40-years-is-it-time-to-reconsider-absol 
ute-immunity-for-prosecutors/.   
 68. Wendy Sawyer & Alex Clark, New Data: The Rise of the “Prosecutor Politician,” 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 13, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/07/13/ 
prosecutors/. 
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Prosecutors have always had tremendous power and discretion. Eighty 
years ago, in 1940, Attorney General Robert Jackson said: “The prosecutor 
has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in 
America.”69 But during the law-and-order era, prosecutorial practices 
became even more aggressive, as prosecutors began to face additional 
pressures to engage in extreme sentencing practices and were now armed 
with new tools that gave them even more power to exercise their discretion 
in a punitive manner.70 As the police began to arrest more people, 
prosecutors also began to use their own discretion to influence incarceration 
rates by charging individuals more aggressively.  
According to findings by John Pfaff, during the 1990s, prosecutors 
began to charge many more arrestees with felonies.71 In 1994, about one of 
every three arrests turned into a felony case.72 By the end of the 2000s, it was 
two out of every three arrests.73 According to Pfaff’s analysis, about half of 
the increase in felony filings came from cases of misdemeanors being 
charged as felonies.74 Prior to the 1990s and this change in prosecutorial 
behavior, many of these arrests would not convert to felony cases and would 
never lead to the type of prison time that they do now.  
The growing number of mandatory minimum laws and harsh sentencing 
schemes, such as habitual offender and truth-in-sentencing laws,75 only 
increased the power of prosecutors. Mandatory punishments transferred 
 
 69. He continued: “His discretion is tremendous. He can have citizens investigated and, 
if he is that kind of person, he can have this done to the tune of public statements and veiled 
or unveiled intimations…The prosecutor can order arrests, present cases to the grand jury in 
secret session, and on the basis of his one-sided presentation of the facts, can cause the citizen 
to be indicted and held for trial. He may dismiss the case before trial, in which case the defense 
never has a chance to be heard. Or he may go on with a public trial.” Robert H. Jackson, The 
Federal Prosecutor, ROBERT H. JACKSON CENTER (Dec. 1, 1940), https://www.roberth 
jackson.org/speech-and-writing/the-federal-prosecutor/.   
 70. Richard A. Oppel Jr, Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, N.Y. 
TIMES  (Sep. 25, 2011). (“No matter how strongly defendants believe they are innocent, he 
said, they could be taking dangerous risks by, for example, turning down a one-year plea 
bargain when the prosecutor threatens additional charges that carry a mandatory sentence 10 
times as long.”) 
 71. JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO 
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (Basic Books 2017). The data Pfaff relied on has been criticized by 
some. See Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass 
Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835 (2018). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. According to the National Academy of Sciences, between 1975 and 1996, mandatory 
minimums law proliferated. By 1994, every state had adopted at least one mandatory 
minimum law, including for drug offenses and serious felonies. TRAVIS, supra note 6, at 83. 
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tremendous discretion in handling cases to prosecutors, who were now 
armed with the discretion to charge individuals or not charge them under 
laws that would mandate extreme sentences.  
One of the most powerful ways that prosecutorial power gets 
manifested is through the culture of plea deals. Jury trials are exceedingly 
rare in the criminal legal system, as the vast majority of people across all 
categories of offenses and at the state and federal level resolve their cases 
through guilty pleas.76 According to a recent Vera Institute report, a criminal 
case is disposed of by plea bargaining every two seconds.77 Ninety-seven 
percent of convictions in large urban state courts and 90 percent in federal 
court are decided through guilty pleas.78 Of these, more than 90 percent are 
a result of plea bargaining.79 For this reason, former Supreme Court Justice 
Anthony Kennedy stated in 2012 that “criminal justice today is for the most 
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”80 
Many prosecutors use the threat of adding charges and sentencing 
enhancements or the promise of dropping charges to pressure defendants into 
agreeing to a plea deal and giving up their right to a trial.81 The more 
draconian the punishment that a prosecutor has at their disposal—high 
mandatory minimums or the ability to charge a young person as an adult—
the more leverage they have to persuade someone to take a plea bargain 
instead of risking a trial.82 As Emily Bazelon illustrated in her book 
Charged:  The New Movement to Transform American Prosecution and End 
Mass Incarceration, in New York, a prosecutor can charge a shoplifter with 
misdemeanor theft, felony theft, or burglary under certain circumstances.83 
The punishments for these crimes range from a few months of probation to 
seven years in prison.84 That is extraordinary discretion in the hands of one 
 
 76. Ram Subramanian, Léon Digard, Melvin Washington II & Stephanie Sorage, In the 
Shadows: A review of the Research on Plea Bargaining, VERA INST. OF JUST., 1 (Sept. 2020). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). 
 81. An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How US Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to 
Plead Guilty, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/report/ 
2013/12/05/offer-you-cant-refuse/how-us-federal-prosecutors-force-drug-defendants-plead. 
 82. Oppel, supra note 70. 
 83. David Garland, The Road to Ending Mass Incarceration Goes Through the DA’s 
Office, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Apr. 8, 2019), https://prospect.org/justice/road-ending-
mass-incarceration-goes-da-s-office/. 
 84. Id.  
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person.85 
 
Similar to the changes in policing, the criminal docket today for 
prosecutors is mostly comprised of low-level offenses and misdemeanors, 
which feature extreme racial disparities. Black people make up nearly 30 
percent of national misdemeanor arrests, although they represent 12 percent 
of the population.86 Misdemeanor charges make up around 70-80 percent 
of state criminal dockets, doubling since 1972, according to the ABA, 
rising from about 5 million to 10 million cases87 (although by some 
estimates, the number is as high as 13 million88). These are charges of 
drug possession, driving with a suspended license, simple assault, disorderly 
conduct, or public intoxication, classic Broken Windows arrests.89 And 
prosecutors decline to prosecute few of these misdemeanor arrests. 
Misdemeanor declination rates range from two percent90 to 12 percent 
(felony arrests are declined at much higher rates, 25-50 percent).91 In a study 
of the Manhattan District Attorney’s office, the Vera Institute found that four 
percent of misdemeanor cases and 11 percent of violations were declined for 
prosecution when initially presented by police.92   
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Alexandra Natapoff, When the Police Become Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 
2018).  
 87. A.B.A. Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 486 (2019). See also, 
Shina Baradaran Baughman & Megan S. Wright, Prosecutors and Mass Incarceration, 94 
USC L. REV. 1, 6-7, (forthcoming 2021). 
 88. Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 Bos. U. 
L. REV. 731, 737, 745, 747, 764-65, 771 (2018). See also Alexandra Natapoff, supra note 87. 
 89. K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of 
Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 273, 
282, 289, 299, 303-04 (2009). 
 90. Alexandra Natapoff, Criminal Misdemeanor Theory and Practice, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOKS ONLINE 1, 7 (2020), https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/ox 
fordhb/9780199935352.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935352-e-9?print=pdf. 
 91. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 54. On felony declination rates, see, Josh Bowers, 
Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1655, 1716, 1719-20 (2010). 
 92. Cases will get dismissed at subsequent phases of the criminal process, up to 36 
percent of felonies and 18 percent of misdemeanors, excluding cases adjourned in 
contemplation of dismissal. See, Besiki Luka Kutateladze & Nancy R. Andiloro, Prosecution 
and Racial Justice in New York County, VERA INST. OF J., (Jan. 31, 2014). Erik Luna, 
Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 795 (2013) (as with 
all issues related to criminal justice, the practice varies tremendously based on the jurisdiction, 
and definition vary across jurisdictions, as some include in declination data a case that is 
diverted and later dismissed). 
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As prosecutor budgets grew, so did cases of low-level offenses, 
comprising a large majority of the criminal docket. Potentially billions of 
dollars a year are spent on prosecuting cases that many would argue should 
not be before the criminal legal system in the first place.  
 
d.   Ten years of reforms result in inadequate progress 
 
Nationwide incarceration rates peaked in 2009 and since then have 
slowly begun to decrease.93 This reduction has come from a growing 
movement, sometimes bipartisan, to reform past practices that have led to 
high incarceration rates.94 The movement has focused on changing 
sentencing policies, pretrial and police practices, parole, and probation, as 
well as removing some of the tens of thousands of legal barriers that have 
been placed on people living with a criminal record.95 Hundreds of laws have 
been passed at the local, state, and even federal levels, many of them pushed 
by new alliances of progressives and liberals with conservatives96 and 
libertarians.97  
 
 93. John Gramlich, America’s incarceration rate is at a two-decade low, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (May 2, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/02/americas-incarce 
ration-rate-is-at-a-two-decade-low/. 
 94. 91 Percent of Americans Support Criminal Justice Reform, ACLU Polling Finds, 
ACLU (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/91-percent-americans-support-
criminal-justice-reform-aclu-polling-finds. 
 95. See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Long-Term Sentences: Time to Reconsider the Scale of 
Punishment, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.sentencing 
project.org/publications/long-term-sentences-time-reconsider-scale-punishment/; Sentencing 
Policy and Practices, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/ 
research/sentencing_policy_and_practices/; What’s at Stake, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/ 
issues/smart-justice. 
 96. Even though the tough-on-crime narratives originated to a large extent with 
conservative Republicans, with many willing champions among Democrats, recent years have 
even seen some Republicans change their tune with red states also passing reforms, even deep 
red states. In 2016, for example, Oklahoma voters, responding to a ballot initiative put forward 
by the ACLU and our allies on the right, approved a law to defelonize simple drug possession 
and raise the monetary threshold for felony property offenses, while reinvesting savings into 
a wide range of alternatives to incarceration like mental health services and drug treatment 
programs. States like Louisiana have also seen significant reforms in recent years. See SQ 780 
and 781, ACLU OF OKLAHOMA, https://www.acluok.org/en/campaigns/sq-780-and-781. 
 97. Inimai Chettiar, The ‘Tough on Crime’ Wave Is Finally Cresting, THE DAILY BEAST 
(Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-tough-on-crime-wave-is-finally-cresting. 
Reforms have passed in both blue states and red states, although the pace and audacity of 
reforms have been greater in blue states, which have seen a higher rate of decarceration, 
particularly in places like New Jersey, Connecticut and New York, which have witnessed 
incarceration levels fall from 36 to 39 percent from their peak. Nazgol 
Ghandnoosh, U.S. Prison Population Decline: Insufficient to Undo Mass Incarceration, THE 
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This movement also began to change presidential politics. In 2008, 
under the candidacy of Barack Obama, Democratic politics began to shift, 
adopting a “smart on crime” platform, a major reversal from the Democrats’ 
1990s tough-on-crime platforms that boasted, among other things, that 
“President Clinton made three-strikes-you’re-out the law of the land.”98 
Even the Republican National Committee platform began to evolve, and by 
2012 stated, “Prisons should do more than punish; they should attempt to 
rehabilitate.”99 At the same time, many within the Republican Party continue 
to perpetuate a tough-on-crime narrative, including President Donald Trump, 
who has consistently run on a tough-on-crime platform, invoking language 
 
SENTENCING PROJECT (May 19, 2020), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/u-s-
prison-decline-insufficient-undo-mass-incarceration/. In New Jersey, for example, 
incarceration levels peaked in 1999, and since then a series of reforms, including improving 
the parole process to allow for more early release and reducing re-incarceration for technical 
violations of parole, as well as changes to the states’ drug free zone laws have led to almost a 
40 percent decrease in the state’s prison population. Id. New Jersey’s jail population has also 
dramatically decreased since the passage of bail reform in 2014. Id. While New Jersey leads 
the nation in decarceration, it also has among the highest rates of racial disparities in 
incarceration. Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State 
Prisons, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-
Prisons.pdf. 
 98. By 2012, the Democratic Party committed to “continue to fight inequalities in our 
criminal justice system.” Maurice Chammah, Two Parties, Two Platforms on Criminal 
Justice, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 18, 2016). Today, candidates who in the past supported 
tough-on-crime measures, like Joe Biden and Kamala Harris, have had to repudiate some of 
their past stances in order to survive a Democratic primary. Michael Kranish, Harris and 
Biden once were at odds on criminal justice issues. Finding common ground helped lead him 
to pick her as his running mate., THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 11, 2020). Joe Biden, who at 
the time of the writing of this article is the president elect of the United States, in particular 
has had to walk back his championing of the 1994 Crime Bill, which created dozens of new 
federal capital crimes, mandated life sentences for some offenses, and authorized more than 
$16 billion for state prison grants and expansion of state and local police forces. Id. By 2020, 
at least within the Democratic Party, the rhetorical shift has been significant. During the 2020 
primary, the ACLU was able to get 14 of Democratic presidential candidates to commit to a 
50 percent decarceration goal should they win. RIGHTS FOR ALL, https://rightsforall.org (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2020). Whether this was just lip-service during a contested primary or 
genuine commitments remains to be seen. 
 99. Chammah, supra note 98. 
  
50 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 2:1] 
more racist than the platforms of Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon,100 
even while supporting some criminal justice reforms.101 
As the national narrative on mass incarceration began to change, the 
issue started to resonate differently in down-ballot races. Advocates began 
to recognize that these often-ignored races can have an even larger impact 
on criminal justice policies. At the top of the list are prosecutor races.  
Historically, the public hardly paid attention to prosecutorial elections. A 
poll conducted by the ACLU in November 2017 found that 47 percent of 
voters across party lines did not know that prosecutors are elected.102 More 
than half of voters said they would skip or didn’t know if they would vote in 
the next election for prosecutor.103 
Yet when asked about what the role of a prosecutor should be, voters 
clearly wanted someone committed to ending mass incarceration and racial 
bias in the criminal legal system. Eighty-nine percent of voters said it was 
very important for prosecutors to actively work towards ending mass 
incarceration.104 Eighty-eight percent of voters are more likely to support a 
prosecutor who believes in reducing racial bias in the criminal justice system, 
and 91 percent believe it is important for a prosecutor to prioritize reducing 
racial inequality, including 90 percent of white voters, 90 percent of Latinx 
voters, and 95 percent of Black voters.105 
Seeing this opportunity, over the past several years, a movement to 
influence the role of prosecutors through the ballot box has emerged. For the 
first time ever, advocates are paying close attention to local races for 
prosecutor, forcing candidates to commit to reforms that will lead to 
 
 100. Austin Sarat, Trump’s law-and-order campaign relies on a historic American 
tradition of racist and anti-immigrant politics, THE CONVERSATION (Sep. 8, 2020), 
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tradition-of-racist-and-anti-immigrant-politics-145366. Moreover, many prominent figures 
within the Republican Party have begun to attack some of the strategies deployed to reduce 
mass incarceration, and in particular, to hold prosecutor’s accountable for reducing mass 
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 101. German Lopez, The First Step Act, explained, VOX (Feb. 5, 2019). 
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decarceration, educating voters on candidate stances, and mobilizing voters 
to come out on election day. 
The same tactics used to build mass incarceration are now being 
positioned as tools to dismantle mass incarceration: prosecutorial 
discretion.106 Advocates are applying pressure on prosecutorial candidates to 
commit to using their discretion to change the way they treat people, 
including in their charging, bail, and plea bargaining decisions.107 Pressure 
is being applied to decline prosecution for a range of offenses and to stop 
asking for cash bail that could lead to pretrial detention.108 The discretion 
used to respond to law-and-order political pressures is now being used to 
respond to a racial justice and end mass incarceration message.109 
When I joined the national ACLU staff in October 2016 to lead the 
organization’s campaign to end mass incarceration, one of the first things I 
did was launch a campaign to engage voters in prosecutorial races.110 This 
was the first time in the ACLU’s 96-year history that we launched a voter 
education and mobilization campaign in candidate races. I couldn’t see how 
we could end mass incarceration without engaging in prosecutor races, 
given their tremendous influence over incarceration rates. I hired Taylor 
Pendergrass to help execute this strategy. 
Our first race was in Philadelphia, where there was a crowded open-seat 
DA race, which is a rare occurrence, particularly in a high incarceration city 
like Philadelphia. Philadelphia district attorneys have historically been 
tough-on-crime prosecutors, and this was a chance to change that. We 
worked in close coordination with a local coalition comprised of numerous 
grassroots organizations, the Philadelphia Coalition for a Just District 
Attorney.111 The ACLU focused on the 11,438 ACLU members registered 
to vote in Philadelphia (around 20 percent of what a candidate would need 
during a normal primary for DA to win), conducted 26,788 door knocks, and 
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hired and trained 51 canvassers who were formerly incarcerated to educate 
and mobilize the thousands of ACLU members who lived in the city.112 We 
held candidate debates, sent tens of thousands of mailers, made phone calls, 
and sent text messages.113 Larry Krasner won and is today one of the nation’s 
leading proponents of using prosecutorial discretion to dismantle mass 
incarceration.114  
This movement has only grown in intensity and scope. Even before the 
election of Larry Krasner, reform candidates had won, like Kim Foxx in 
Chicago and Aramis Ayala in Orange County, Florida. But since that 
election, the movement has spread much further, with more reform 
candidates winning, like Rachael Rollins in Boston, Chesa Boudin in San 
Francisco, Stephanie Morales in Portsmouth, Virginia, Parisa Dehghano-
Tafti in Arlington, Virginia, and others. Candidates who have personal 
experience with the criminal legal system are winning, such as Rollins, who 
has talked about her two siblings who are incarcerated.115 As of this writing, 
there are competitive races in Phoenix, Los Angeles, New Orleans, and other 
jurisdictions that are largely referenda on a prosecutor’s role in reducing 
mass incarceration.  
Over the past four years, the ACLU alone has engaged in 45 district 
attorney races in 15 states, knocking on more than 400,000 doors, placing 
tens of thousands of phone calls, sending questionnaires to hundreds of 
candidates, paying for campaign materials seen by millions of people, and 
organizing election events attended by thousands of people.116 There are 
numerous organizations across the nation, particularly grassroots 
organizations, who have taken charge of their local DA races. National 
political action committees, like George Soros’s Justice and Public Safety 
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PAC, Color of Change PAC, and Real Justice PAC are focusing on electing 
progressive prosecutors.117 
But these reforms have been slow and inadequate to address the core 
problem of mass incarceration. Incarceration rates are still at the 1990s 
levels. According to the Sentencing Project, all but six states have reduced 
their prison populations since reaching their peak levels, but in 25 states, the 
reduction in imprisonment levels was less than 10%.118 Six states had their 
highest ever prison populations in 2018: Wyoming, Nebraska, Iowa, 
Wisconsin, Kansas, and Oregon.119 
By 2019, the prison population in the United States was at 1.4 million 
people, declining by 11 percent since reaching its peak level in 2009 (the 
prison incarceration rate declined 17 percent).120 This followed a nearly 700 
percent growth in the prison population between 1972 and 2009.121 At the 
pace of decarceration since 2009, averaging one percent annually, it will take 
65 years— until 2085—to cut the U.S. prison population in half.122 
Meanwhile, jails have seen an even slower pace of decarceration, with the 
volume of incarceration declining only six percent since 2008.123 The United 
States continues to be an international anomaly, with exponentially higher 
incarceration rates than similar countries.124 Other metrics of mass 
incarceration also paint a bleak picture. Police violence continues at the same 
rate, with about three people, disproportionately Black, shot and killed by 
police a day.125 Law-and-order rhetoric continues to be deployed, including 
in campaigns for the highest office in the land.126  
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Continuing down the same path of reforms is not enough. We need a 
new ideological framework and strategy. 
 
II. The case for defunding prosecutors as part of the solution to 
ending mass incarceration 
 
Despite more than a decade of reforms and hundreds of laws passing to 
tackle mass incarceration, the footprint of the criminal legal system is still 
expansive and an international anomaly.127 Tens of thousands of people are 
out of prison due to reforms, but we have not achieved the transformational 
change needed to end mass incarceration, let alone come close to bringing 
the United States in line with other wealthy democratic nations. At this point, 
the solution must go beyond attempting to pass better laws: the system needs 
to be starved of resources and forced to dramatically narrow its focus and 
size.  
At the heart of this must be a reorientation from the tough-on-crime era 
to a prioritization of social welfare, public health, and alternatives to 
policing, prosecution, and incarceration as the primary mechanisms to build 
community safety. Billions are spent on prosecution, policing and 
corrections, dwarfing investments in mental health care and other services 
and programs designed to prevent and interrupt violence. The United States 
has spent decades investing in extreme punishment as a way to address 
behaviors that shouldn’t involve the criminal legal system in the first 
place.128 Now it must do the opposite and invest in alternative models of 
public safety. 
A large majority of a prosecutor office’s docket today involves 
misdemeanor cases.129 Prosecutor offices spend a substantial amount of their 
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time prosecuting cases that do not pose a significant, let alone serious threat 
to public safety. These dockets are a reflection of the increase of 
misdemeanor cases during the tough-on-crime era, with police enforcing 
Broken Windows and order-maintenance policing strategies and prosecutors 
being encouraged to crack down on all offenses, no matter how small. 
It’s time to rethink this entire notion of public safety and deemphasize 
reforms that continue to rely primarily on the criminal legal system. 
Solutions should focus on removing criminal legal system actors, 
prosecutors included, from the equation altogether whenever possible. It 
means forcing our nation to rethink how we administer accountability and 
how we spend our resources. Reforms around avoiding wrongful 
convictions, one of the main mantras for progressive prosecutors,130 are 
important, but not enough as they ignore the convictions that are technically 
“lawful” but not ethically right.  
This reimagining of public safety will not occur voluntarily, and rarely 
by the actors who benefit financially, politically, and reputationally from it, 
including even those actors who ran on reform agendas. A system awash in 
resources will always find ways to spend those resources. For progressive 
prosecutors, this often means trying to create a criminal legal system that is 
fairer, which is understandable. But creating a fairer process to adjudicate an 
arrest that should not be handled by the criminal legal system in the first 
place is inadequate, even if well-meaning. Law enforcement offices, even 
those headed by progressives, cannot be relied upon to be the primary agents 
of change that will lead to loss of jobs, budgets, and power for these very 
same offices.   
This is at the heart of the Black Lives Matter movement to defund the 
police—taking the billions of dollars spent on policing and reinvesting it in 
both preventive measures, like public health and education, but also in 
alternatives to police, like crisis intervention teams that can respond to a 
person suffering from a mental health breakdown without resorting to law 
enforcement tactics. It’s about beginning the process of ending the culture 
and ideology that relies primarily on punishment in the criminal legal system 
and about moving away from an overreliance on procedural reforms, such as 
more trainings and body cameras, as the primary solutions to end police 
violence. 
The same principle must be applied to prosecutors. The United States 
has seen an exponential growth in incarceration because of law-and-order 
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politicians, including prosecutors, pushing policies and practices that have 
led to more activities and more people being criminalized and for longer 
periods.131 The solution to this problem is to stop criminalizing people and 
these activities and to remove prosecutors altogether from many of the 
situations currently before them.132 
 
a. Prosecutor offices grow significantly, including under reformers 
 
Prosecutor offices have grown significantly during the era of mass 
incarceration. The nationwide data on prosecutorial budgets are limited, but 
even with this limited data, we know that during the rise of mass 
incarceration, prosecutor offices nationwide experienced tremendous 
increases in their staff size and their budgets. And data from local 
jurisdictions bolster this point. 
In 2007, the last year for which we have nationwide data, prosecutor 
offices reported a total budget of $5.8 billion ($7.3 billion in 2020 dollars).133 
The earliest year for which we have reliable nationwide data is 1994, and the 
2007 amount represents an increase of $3 billion, or 71 percent, over the span 
of just 13 years.134 
In 2007, prosecutor offices employed nearly 78,000 staff, including 
25,000 full time assistant prosecutors.135 Tens of thousands of people earned 
their livelihood based on the current functioning of the criminal legal system. 
And these numbers do not include municipal attorneys or county attorneys, 
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who primarily operate in courts of limited jurisdiction and handle almost 
exclusively low-level offenses.  
Prosecutor offices reported closing 2.9 million cases charged as felonies 
in 2007, a 334 percent increase from 1990.136 No data was reported for 
misdemeanors by the Bureau of Justice in the 2007 report, but recent studies 
estimate that there were 13.2 million misdemeanor cases filed in the United 
States in 2016, with the number of cases hitting their peak during the height 
of Broken Windows policing in the 1990s.137 
While nationwide data on prosecutorial budgets are not current, we do 
have access to updated data from the largest city in the United States, New 
York City. Crime rates in New York City have plummeted over the past 30 
years, yet the five district attorney offices in the city only grew. New York 
City spends $456 million a year to fund its five district attorney offices, one 
for each borough, and a citywide Special Narcotics Prosecutor.138 The 
federal government and New York State spend an additional $13 million.139 
According to an analysis by the Independent Budget Office, New York 
City-funded prosecutor staffing has tripled since 1980, from 1,551 
individuals in 1980 to 4,688 in 2020.140 This occurred even though felony 
arrests are down by 49 percent since 1989, and misdemeanor arrests are 
down 55 percent since peaking in 2010.141 In fact, although total arrests have 
fallen 45 percent from their peak in 2010, prosecutorial staffing during this 
same period increased by 31 percent.142  
The Manhattan DA office alone employs 1,551 staff people, the same 
number that all the DAs in New York City had combined 40 years ago.143 
During the 10 years of Cy Vance, who has run as a reformer and regularly 
speaks at reform conferences, the number of staff in the Manhattan DA office 
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grew by 21 percent.144 In 2019, DA Vance requested $12 million for 
additional personnel and resources.145 Similar requests came from the 
other boroughs. In Queens, staffing has surged by 42 percent since 
2010.146 And the Bronx DA’s Office has increased staffing by 47 percent 
over the past decade.147 Many of these staffing increases have been justified 
by claims that they are focusing on “community outreach,” “launching 
initiatives to guarantee equal justice,” and to launch “anti-drug initiatives to 
fight the opioid epidemic.”148 
But what type of cases did New York City’s prosecutors actually handle 
with this money? In 2018, the Manhattan DA prosecuted 52,224 cases, 81 
percent of which were misdemeanors or violations.149 By far, the most 
common charges of all of the cases were petit larceny150 (8,225), third-degree 
assault (6,428), and possession of drugs, including marijuana (5,223).151 
These are all low-level offenses, many of which shouldn’t involve the 
criminal legal system in the first place. 
Other jurisdictions, including those led by progressive prosecutors, 
have also sought budget increases or have fought against cuts while 
continuing to focus heavily on misdemeanor prosecutions.152 Just this year, 
District Attorney Larry Krasner requested an 11 percent increase in his 
budget and criticized a proposed $8.7 million budget cut to his office, saying 
it would hamper prosecutions.153 “There’s absolutely no way this office can 
perform properly,” Krasner said.154 
So, let’s take a look at the Philadelphia DA docket. There is no question 
that significant changes have occurred under DA Krasner’s leadership. There 
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has been a 24 percent drop in the number of charges brought by the 
Philadelphia DA office during Larry Krasner’s time.155 District Attorney 
Krasner has worked with Mayor Jim Kenney and others to institute diversion 
programs to keep people away from incarceration.156 While the ACLU and 
others have voiced criticisms of DA Krasner, he has been a leader in the 
progressive prosecutor space. I know from personal conversations with him 
that he is genuinely committed to tackling mass incarceration. 
But even under his leadership, there have been an average of 3,625 drug 
possession charges a year, 2,221 charges a year for simple assault, hundreds 
of charges a year for sex work or threats of violence, and thousands charged 
a year for property offenses.157 This represents thousands of charges a year 
for drug possession alone that should not involve the criminal legal system 
in the first place, making it difficult to justify a request for additional 
resources.158 
A more compelling position would be for Krasner to advocate for a 
reduction in his budget, a decision to decline prosecutions for drug 
possession and select additional categories, and to redirect savings from this 
to alternative community-based models for addressing harm and community 
safety.159  
Harris County District Attorney Kim Ogg is probably the most 
infamous example of a prosecutor running on a reform platform and then 
going against community wishes and demanding more money. In February 
2019, Harris County commissioners rejected DA Ogg’s request for an 
additional $20 million to hire 102 additional prosecutors.160 Ogg had 
requested a 40 percent increase in her budget, which was opposed by local 
organizations such as the Texas Organizing Project, which campaigned for 
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Ogg when she ran for DA in 2016.161 The organizations accused Ogg of 
violating her pledge to reform the criminal legal system, remarking that 
additional prosecutors will lead to more people in jail.162 
This is a tension point that will only increase as some progressive 
prosecutors fight for an expansion of their budgets, rationalizing it by 
arguing that additional funding will be used to divert people from 
incarceration. Yet every dollar spent by the government on prosecutors and 
courts is a dollar not spent on funding resources that will allow people to 
thrive outside of the criminal legal system. I would argue that for many of 
these cases, there is no need for a diversion program or any contact with the 
criminal legal system. Drug possession remains the number one arrest in the 
United States. Yet in those cases where an individual is consuming drugs for 
their own use and not harming others, there is no need for criminal 
intervention. Police should not make these arrests, and if they do, prosecutors 
should immediately decline to prosecute them without spending resources 
on drug courts or diversion programs.163 If there are substance abuse needs, 
then public health agencies should respond.  
In fact, even during the height of the Black Lives Matter movement in 
the summer of 2020, DA offices were getting bigger budgets, including for 
activities such as marijuana enforcement. In July 2020, the Santa Barbara 
County Board of Supervisors approved a $20.5 million increase for public 
safety, including hundreds of thousands of dollars for “cannabis 
enforcement-related requests from the Sheriff’s and District Attorney’s 
offices.”164 
While prosecutorial budgets grew, indigent defense spending went 
down, according to an analysis by the Brennan Center. Between 2009 and 
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2014, 18 states increased indigent defense spending, while 26 decreased it.165 
Nationwide, spending went down 4.3 percent over that time, as $2.2 billion 
was spent by states on indigent defense in fiscal year 2012 — the lowest 
amount in the previous five years.166 By comparison, the total budget for 
prosecutors was $5.8 billion in 2007, equivalent to $6.4 billion in 2012 
dollars, close to triple the amount spent on defense (assuming no increase in 
prosecutorial budgets between 2007-2012, which is unlikely).167 
Some prosecutors have recognized the need to reduce their own 
budgets. Stephanie Morales recently said: 
 
If the community wants to defund the police, that means that the 
entire criminal legal system will hopefully shrink. That means that 
my office will lose resources, and I am perfectly fine with that. If 
you are truly a person with a public servant’s heart, and you want to 
get this right, we should want to shrink the system.168  
 
Commonwealth Attorney Stephanie Morales is right. 
 
b. Reducing the power and budgets of prosecutors to shrink the 
carceral footprint  
 
The majority of the criminal court docket today is comprised of 
misdemeanor cases. Estimates range from 9 to 13 million cases a year, and 
data suggest that few misdemeanor and violation arrests are declined by 
prosecutors (range from 2-12 percent).169 This means that billions of dollars 
a year are spent to maintain offices that adjudicate matters that in many cases 
can be handled outside of the criminal legal system. 
As arrests and prosecutions increased during the rise of mass 
incarceration and the era of Broken Windows policing, so did prosecutorial 
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budgets. In some offices, staffing has tripled.170 Nationwide, billions of 
additional dollars are spent on prosecutions, while 70-80 percent of the 
criminal docket continues to be comprised of misdemeanors.171 
The time has come to disentangle the criminal legal system from many 
of these cases that are a byproduct of the tough-on-crime era. If the nation is 
to ever move beyond the mass incarceration era, and genuinely embrace a 
new approach to community safety, then it must include removing police and 
prosecutors from involvement in many behaviors that currently fall under the 
criminal legal system umbrella.172 For example, the 1.2 million drug 
possession arrests currently processed by police each year should not be 
handled by the criminal legal system, and prosecutors should decline them 
when they come before their offices.  
This reimagining of public safety will not occur voluntarily, and 
certainly not by the actors who benefit the most from it. Prosecutorial 
budgets have increased by billions, even though crime is at a low, and arrests 
are down across the board. Prosecutors continue to ask for more money and 
threaten lawmakers and voters when their budgets come under scrutiny.173 
The status quo cannot continue. The criminal legal system today is too 
large and its jurisdiction too wide. It is a product of political decisions that 
have been made for decades to over-police and over-incarcerate 
communities of color and low-income communities. It does not make us 
safer, but it does perpetuate racial inequality. While billions of dollars have 
been spent to grow and maintain this system, other public health and 
community services have been ignored or cut. The majority of people in 
prison suffer from chronic health conditions or have mental health or 
substance abuse needs. Yet, instead of being provided basic services, they 
have been locked in cages and forgotten. 
For these reasons, the movement to end mass incarceration should begin 
pressuring stakeholders to cut prosecutorial budgets and decriminalize many 
of the offenses currently adjudicated by prosecutors that do not belong in the 
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criminal legal system. Millions of cases are prosecuted on an annual basis 
that could be better resolved outside of the criminal legal system. There are 
too many prosecutions in the United States, and in order to reduce the 
number of these prosecutions, crimes should be decriminalized and budgets 
should be cut. Simultaneously, real investments should be made to address 
the urgent need to provide services to people who have mental health, 
substance abuse, and chronic health needs or who have low educational 
attainment or housing insecurity.  
Progressive prosecutors in particular should begin to adopt this position 
instead of relying on more funding to implement reforms that only bolster 
the criminal legal system. In order to end mass incarceration, we must narrow 
the footprint of the criminal legal system and remove prosecutors from many 
of the cases they currently handle. It is rare for prosecutors to see a reduction 
in their budgets. This must change. 
These cuts can help achieve transformational change that moves the 
nation away from the mass incarceration path. Reforms that focus on 
procedural changes or that rely primarily on the criminal legal system for 
fairer practices can be important to reduce the harm currently experienced 
by people, but they won’t end mass incarceration. In fact, they can even take 
the wind out of the sails of the movement, as observed in a recent Harvard 
Law Review note: “diversion programs might be celebrated as acts of grace, 
but they also divert energy from challenging the power of a prosecutor to 
make an individual submit to state monitoring.”174 
Politics have driven the rise of mass incarceration, and politics from the 
bottom-up must drive its dismantling. The Black Lives Matter movement has 
forced the United States to begin reckoning with its racism and its 
dehumanization of Black lives. A key part of this reckoning must be the 
dismantling of the systems that have criminalized Black and Latinx 
communities. We know what community safety can look like if done right—
it is the system in place in white affluent communities. It is time to bring this 
same approach to communities of color in the United States who have been 
targeted for decades by mass incarceration. 
 
III. How to reduce the power and budgets of prosecutors 
 
In order for the United States to be in line with other wealthy democratic 
nations, incarceration rates will need to be reduced by 80 or 90 percent. This 
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would bring us in line with countries like Germany and Canada.175 More of 
the same will not achieve this goal. 
Years of advocacy to change laws have not led to the substantial 
reduction in incarceration necessary to end mass incarceration. For example, 
electing progressive prosecutors has led to some reforms, but not the seismic 
shift that is needed to end mass incarceration. What this article proposes is 
that instead of relying on the criminal legal system to reduce its own power, 
advocates should focus more of their energies on narrowing the scope of the 
criminal legal system, reducing the number of people whose jobs and 
responsibilities rely on the operations of the criminal legal system as well as 
their budgets, and proactively reinvesting savings into alternatives to 
policing, prosecution and incarceration, and preventive measures that have 
been neglected for too long. 
Prosecutors have seen tremendous growth in staff and resources during 
the tough-on-crime era. By reducing their budgets and narrowing their scope 
and jurisdiction, fewer people will be processed by the system. Cases that 
shouldn’t involve the criminal legal system in the first place will be avoided, 
while those cases that require a government response of some sorts will have 
the option to be processed outside of the criminal legal system. This call for 
divestment must also begin to guide the progressive prosecutor movement. 
Something is fundamentally wrong when prosecutors who run on platforms 
with commitments to end mass incarceration are seeing double-digit 
increases in their budgets. It reflects a dissonance between those who are 
calling for dramatic changes and a criminal legal system that still relies on 
arrest, prosecution, and incarceration as its primary tactics. 
Here are the top eight recommendations, in five categories, to guide 
advocates and policymakers to reduce the power and budgets of prosecutors.  
 
a. Restrict prosecutor jurisdiction and direct discretion towards 
decarceration 
 
States and municipalities should decriminalize more laws to remove 
prosecutors from cases that do not necessitate a criminal legal system 
response. In 2019, there were 10,085,207 arrests.176 The number one arrest 
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in the United States, by far, was for drug abuse violations, with 1,558,862 
arrests, and of these, around 80 percent were for simple drug possession.177 
Eighty percent of the 10 million arrests a year are for misdemeanors, with 
more than a million for minor misbehaviors such as disorderly conduct, 
vagrancy, and loitering.178 While around 25 percent of arrests are for drugs 
and trivial offenses, about five percent are for serious offenses involving 
violence.179 
These low-level misdemeanors are the activities that are most ripe for 
decriminalization and that could have a substantial impact on current 
prosecutorial dockets.180 Most misdemeanor arrests result in charges – 
misdemeanor declination rates range from 3 to 12 percent depending on the 
charge and jurisdiction.181 By decriminalizing these offenses, the dockets of 
prosecutor offices will decrease significantly, thus allowing for the 
downsizing of the budget and staff of prosecutorial offices and the 
reinvestment of savings into proactive measures that build healthy and safe 
communities. 
Second, state legislators should direct prosecutors to exercise their 
discretion whenever possible to avoid incarceration or to achieve lower 
sentences. State lawmakers have the authority to regulate prosecutorial 
behavior. They should pass laws that push prosecutors to exercise their 
discretion in favor of decarceration. For example, lawmakers should direct 
prosecutors to decline to prosecute a case if it serves no protective purpose. 
This would be similar to tactics deployed by some chief prosecutors that 
encourage a certain outcome based on policy preferences. When Eric Holder 
became Attorney General, he issued a memorandum directing his United 
States Attorneys to determine whether there is no adequate non-criminal 
alternative to prosecution before charging a person with a crime.182 State 
lawmakers can codify this sort of direction into state law. 
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By requiring that prosecutors use their discretion to decline cases 
whenever appropriate, state lawmakers will reorient prosecutors away from 
the tough-on-crime approach, placing an emphasis on declinations and 
pressuring police to arrest fewer people.183  
Third, prosecutors should restrict their own authority by designating 
more categories of cases to be declined. When police officers arrest, 
prosecutors then have to decide whether that arrest is going to convert into a 
criminal case or whether it’s going to be declined and remain merely an 
arrest. Prosecutor offices currently spend a substantial amount of their time 
prosecuting cases for minor infractions, behaviors that shouldn’t be 
addressed by the criminal legal system. Chief prosecutors should issue 
guidelines directing their line attorneys to follow these declinations.  
There are examples of this happening. Suffolk County District Attorney 
Rachael Rollins has reduced the prosecution of more than a dozen offenses, 
including drug possession, trespassing, and larceny under $250, although it 
is unclear whether this has been fully implemented.184 In Chicago, Cook 
County State’s Attorney Kim Foxx stopped prosecuting people arrested for 
driving on a driver’s licenses suspended for financial reasons.185 Brooklyn 
DA Eric Gonzalez and Manhattan DA Vance issued policies to no longer 
prosecute fare evasion.186 Philadelphia DA Krasner and St. Louis City 
Circuit Attorney Kim Gardner have directed their staff not to charge most 
cases of marijuana possession.187  
At the very least, prosecutors must decline prosecution of simple drug 
possession cases, which have no business in the criminal legal system. But 
the list should go much further and include classic Broken Windows charges 
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such as disorderly conduct, trespass, underage drinking, and petit larceny, to 
name a few examples. Individuals may need to be held accountable in many 
of these circumstances, but not by the criminal legal system. 
 
b. Cut prosecutor budgets 
 
Prosecutor offices are funded through a variety of sources. In 2005, the 
last year of nationwide data, half of prosecutor offices received at least 82 
percent of their funds from county governments, about half of offices 
received state funds, and 40 percent received state and federal funds.188 
Advocates should pressure policymakers, including city council 
members, mayors, county commissioners as well as federal actors, to begin 
cutting prosecutorial budgets, particularly as more laws are decriminalized 
and arrests declined. These cuts would force prosecutors to focus only on the 
most serious arrests and decline to prosecute those arrests that should not be 
within the criminal legal system. By narrowing the focus of prosecution, 
police officers will also be forced to begin reconsidering their practices. 
The arguments should be that the majority of the docket for 
prosecutorial offices are misdemeanor and low-level offenses that should not 
involve the criminal legal system. Prosecutorial budgets have increased by 
billions of dollars, while social welfare programs have been cut or stayed 
stagnant, failing to see the same increases as the criminal legal system. We 
need to shrink prosecutorial budgets so that prosecutors no longer spend their 
time on matters that should not involve the criminal legal system, and the 
savings should be reinvested in alternative mechanisms to address any 
underlying misbehavior or need, including preventive measures that keep 
people from becoming entangled in the criminal legal system in the first 
place.  
Second, prosecutors already in office should start reducing their own 
budgets. Progressive prosecutors can show their commitment to reducing the 
footprint of the criminal legal system by cutting their own budgets. They 
should not ask for additional funding to implement new programs within 
their office, including programs being considered in the name of a less 
punitive criminal legal system. Every dollar spent on the criminal legal 
system is a dollar not spent on alternatives. Instead, progressive prosecutors 
should divest their office from cases that do not belong in the criminal legal 
system and reduce their budgets appropriately. 
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For both, cutting the budget should include disbanding specialized units 
that are relics of the past, such as narcotics units that are a product of the War 
on Drugs.  
 
c. Make prosecutor elections about who will be better at reducing 
budgets and dockets 
 
Reformers and progressive prosecutors who are seeking elections to be 
chief district attorney should provide a vision for how they will reduce their 
own budgets and dockets if elected. They should set clear reduction goals, 
explaining how much they will cut their budgets and dockets by and how. 
Doing so will provide a vision for this re-imagination of community safety 
and force conversations during the electoral process about the bloated 
criminal legal system. 
These commitments will be similar to pledges recently made by some 
candidates to cut incarceration rates in their jurisdictions by a certain 
percentage during their tenure if elected.189 For example, in 2018, as a 
candidate, Dallas District Attorney John Creuzot committed to cutting 
incarceration by 15-20 percent by the end of his first term.190 The ACLU 
pushes for these commitments in all of the DA races we engage in. 
Candidates should commit to reducing their budgets and to not 
requesting additional funding to implement reforms that may seem appealing 
but in reality just increase the reach of the carceral system. Similarly, 
candidates for office should release the categories of offenses that they 
would immediately decline to prosecute and provide a vision for how they 
will reduce their office dockets.  
Candidates should be prepared to defend these policies during the 
electoral process and provide a vision for reimagining community safety. 
Making these commitments during elections will also make the process 
easier to implement once elected since it will have the stamp of approval 
from voters and help newly elected chief prosecutors face hostile line 
prosecutors, police officers, and their unions. 
 
 
 189. Taylor Pendergrass, The 2018 Midterm Elections Demonstrate Criminal Justice 
Reform Is a Winner at the Ballot Box, ACLU (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/2018-midterm-elections-demonstrate-criminal-
justice-reform-winner-ballot-box.   
 190. Shawn Shinneman, The Era of Dallas County District Attorney John Creuzot Is 
Almost Here, D MAGAZINE (Nov. 26, 2018). 
  
2021 Defunding Prosecutors and Reinvesting in Communities 69 
d. Reinvest savings in alternative models 
 
Once prosecutor budgets are cut, savings must go towards delivering 
safety in a manner that does not involve the criminal legal system. This 
should include investing in resources that promote health and social stability 
in communities that have been targeted by aggressive policing and 
prosecutions. It also means investing in programs related to mental health 
and addiction and investing in more housing and educational opportunities 
that have been proven to reduce crime and violence. 
There are a growing number of examples of alternatives to police 
responses that do not include arrests or citations, such as emergency 
responders and community-led safety responses that do not involve police.191 
Instead of relying solely on police to respond to emergency situations, health 
care workers or emergency response teams that do not include police can 
handle many incidents, such as when someone calls 911 to report a drug 
overdose or someone experiencing a mental health breakdown. In Austin, 
Texas, the 911 dispatchers are trained to ask whether mental health services 
are needed and then dispatching appropriate non-police professionals.192 
Eugene, Oregon has been deploying the Crisis Assistance Helping Out On 
the Streets (CAHOOTS) teams for years in response to emergency calls that 
require crisis interventionists and a medic, and not police.193 Some 
jurisdictions are deploying conflict interrupters and restorative justice teams 
to mediate situations and prevent further violence from occurring.194 
Violence interruption programs are led by people from the community that 
they are dispatched to and who have personal experience navigating these 
difficult situations.  
By cutting prosecutorial budgets, savings can be reinvested in these 
preventive alternatives to policing and prosecution models. Prosecutor 
budgets have increased by billions while the significant majority of the 
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criminal docket consists of low level offenses and while alternative programs 
lack adequate funding. Fourteen million students attend schools that have 
on-site police but no counselor, nurse, psychologist, or social worker. 
Communities looking to prevent violence should invest in the things people 
need to thrive. 
 
e. Reimagining responses to offenses involving violence 
 
Much of this article has focused on prosecutors declining to charge 
many of the 80 percent of arrests that come into their office that are 
misdemeanors. Doing so will cut a significant slice of the prosecutorial 
budget and will help millions of people. 
But in order to more substantially reduce mass incarceration, 
prosecutors will need to also reduce incarceration for offenses involving 
violence. This will obviously be a more difficult task, as prosecutors will 
face tremendous internal and external resistance to showing any sort of 
perceived leniency to people arrested for offenses involving violence. But 
this work is needed if we are ever to end mass incarceration, as more than 50 
percent of people in state prisons are incarcerated for offenses involving 
violence.195 
First, there needs to be a recognition that people who are accused of 
committing violent crimes are often themselves victims of violence and 
trauma. Research has demonstrated that people who are convicted of violent 
crimes often live under circumstances where violence is pervasive and in 
environments that lack basic social safety nets and include economic 
uncertainty.196 They are likely to have been exposed to poverty, inequality, 
high unemployment, and lack of educational and economic opportunities. 
We should think of a person who may have caused serious harm as someone 
who has themselves suffered serious harm. 
This is important not only because it humanizes the individual, but 
also because it presents a broader range of options for holding that individual 
accountable and ensuring that they do not commit serious harm again. 
Accountability mechanisms should consider the underlying needs that led to 
the misbehavior while also holding the individual accountable for their 
actions. Programs focused on people suspected of committing crimes 
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involving violence, like Common Justice, provide alternative to 
incarceration models. These programs are based on restorative justice 
principles that try to repair the harm caused by the violence but to do so in a 
rehabilitative and holistic manner, while also holding the individual 
accountable for their actions.197  
Another alternative is to adopt a public health approach to violence 
as a crime reduction strategy. Studies have shown that exposure to violence 
increases the likelihood of acting violently198, similar to how exposure to a 
virus increases a person’s chances of becoming ill with the virus. 
Organizations like Cure Violence take a public health approach to reduce the 
spread of violence by detecting and interrupting potential violent conflicts.199 
Similarly, investing in programs targeted at young people to mitigate the 
likelihood they engage in violent behavior has been shown to decrease a 
young person’s chances for violence.200  
When it comes to transforming how we respond to violent offenses, 
some states have already begun taking small steps towards reform. For 
example, Iowa passed legislation a few years ago that allows judges greater 
discretion when sentencing certain robberies.201 Similarly, prosecutors can 
set internal guidelines mandating the lowest possible charge for robbery, 
which often has a wide range of charging possibilities. Prosecutors can even 
mandate declining an arrest when there are extenuating circumstances that 
require a response from outside of the criminal legal system, such as 
substance abuse needs that lead to the behavior or economic hardship that 
pushed an individual to act this way. According to the Justice Policy 
Institute, the average sentence length for robbery in the United States is 7.5 
years, while in England and Wales, it’s just over 3 years. In Finland, it’s just 
under 1.5 years.202 Prosecutors can help reduce these sentence lengths and 
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CONCLUSION 
 
It’s time to rethink the entire criminal legal system by dramatically 
narrowing its scope, size and power, including by removing criminal legal 
system actors, such as prosecutors, from the equation altogether whenever 
possible. In order for the United States to be in line with other wealthy 
democratic nations, incarceration rates will need to be reduced by 80 or 90 
percent, which would bring us in line with countries like Germany and 
Canada.203 More of the same will not achieve this goal.  
At the heart of this must be a reorientation from the tough-on-crime era 
to a prioritization of social welfare, public health, and alternatives to 
policing, prosecution, and incarceration as the primary mechanisms to build 
community safety. While it may seem daunting to rely less on police and 
prosecutions, the truth is that this different world already exists in 
communities that are largely white and affluent, where policing and 
prosecution look very different than in communities of color. The time has 
come to bring to the entire United States the same values of safety with 
dignity that has been historically reserved for affluent white Americans. 
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